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COMMENTS
JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR DISAPPOINTED BIDDERS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
by Darrel A. Rice
Federal procurement has a tremendous impact on the national economy and
the quality of American life. The United States Government annually spends
over $50 billion on contracts for the procurement of goods and services.' The
procedures employed to award government contracts are of vital interest to
the many firms and communities which depend on such contracts for all or
part of their livelihood. The public has an interest in seeing that its tax dollars
are spent fairly. Furthermore, government contracts have an important role as
a device for performing public functions and implementing various public
policies, such as those concerning small business, equal employment, the environment, labor standards, and fair wages." Federal government procurement
has thus assumed an important position in the economy and general well-being
of the nation which warrants close scrutiny in both administrative and judicial
tribunals.
Authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the Government is delegated
by statute from Congress to departments in the executive branch of the Government. Contracts are usually awarded under the authority of the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949' or the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947.' These statutes are implemented by procurement
regulations' which, if reasonably related to the administration of a congressional
act, have the force and effect of law.' The statutes and regulations provide that
contracts may be awarded either by means of formal advertising (competitive
bidding)' or by negotiation.! The federal statutes indicate that Congress prefers
competitive bidding, since procurement by negotiation is only permitted as an
exception to the general policy of permitting full competition through formal
advertising of bids.' Nevertheless, negotiated contracts account for the largest
part of total Government expenditures for procurement." In negotiated pro'Hearings on H.R. 474 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 222, 394, 403 (1969).
'See, e.g., R. NASH & J. CIBINIC, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW 383-441 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as NAsH & CIBINIC]; Miller & Pierson, Observations on the Consistency
of Federal Procurement Policies with Other Government Policies, 29 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 277 (1964); Stover, The Government Contract System as a Problem in Public Policy,
32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 701 (1964).
'41 U.S.C. § 251-60 (1971).
410

U.S.C.

5 2301-14 (1971).

'Federal Procurement Regulations (FPR), 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.000 to .1806 (1972);
Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), 32 C.F.R. §5 1.100-30.9 (1971); National Aeronautics and Space Administration Procurement Regulations (NASAPR), 41
C.F.R. §§ 18-1.100 to .5204 (1971).
6Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 255 (1963); Schoenbrod v. United States, 410
F.2d 400, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
7
NASH & CiBINIC 221-73.
'Id. at 274-332.
'10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1971); 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1971).
"Hearings on H.R. 474, supra note 1, at 222, 394. Negotiation accounted for 86.2%
of military procurement dollars spent, with formal advertising accounting for only 13.8%.
However, about 43% of procurement expenditures were placed under competitive tech-
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curement, the contracting officer's authority allows a good deal more discretion
in decision-making than do competitive bidding procedures. The federal
statutes regulating bidding require that the award of the contract shall be made
to the lowest responsible, 1 responsive"5 bidder.
When a contracting officer's decision gives one bidder an advantage over his
competitor the latter frequently seeks judicial relief. A contract formed contrary to the authority delegated to the contracting officer by statute or regulation
is void and creates no binding obligation."3 A bidder who unsuccessfully
competed for such a contract and who might have received the award, had
the contracting officer complied with the applicable procurement statutes and
regulations, should seemingly be able to have the Government void the contracts. Before the disappointed bidder can get judicial review, however, he
must overcome the hurdles of standing and nonreviewability. Standing concerns the question of whether the plaintiff is a proper party to secure review.14
Nonreviewability concerns the question of whether the action challenged is
judicially reviewable." Disappointed bidders on government contracts have
traditionally been denied standing to sue, and have thus been precluded from
judicial redress." Recent cases, however, have greatly relaxed if not abandoned
the doctrine that unsuccessful bidders lack standing to sue.' Yet, even though
disappointed bidders now apparently have standing, other recent cases have
denied judicial review by holding that the challenged action is committed to
agency discretion and, therefore, unreviewable. Those cases granting review
have often defined the scope of review narrowly or otherwise denied relief on
the merits. This Comment will examine each of these stumbling blocks along
the path of the disappointed bidder seeking judicial relief.
I. STANDING

The courts, in deciding the issue of standing, must determine whether the
plaintiff in question is a proper party to seek an adjudication of a particular
niques. Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,780, at 85,801 n.6
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 1971).
"The congressional mandate is that the award of a contract shall be made to "that
responsible bidder whose bid . . . will be considered most advantageous to the Government,
price and other factors considered." 41 U.S.C. S 253(b) (1971).
Since formal advertising is based upon open competition, the Government
does not pre-judge or pre-select bidders. Thus, bids are often received from
bidders who do not possess the ability or resources to perform the contract.
In addition, an otherwise able bidder may become disabled between the time
of opening and award. Thus, prior to award, procurement officials must ascertain that the bidder selected will be able to perform the contract and that he
meets established standards for Government contractors. If the bidder does not
possess such qualifications he is not responsible and may not receive the
award.
NASH & CIBINIc 251.
"A bid may contain mistakes or omissions, or may include conditions or provisions not
authorized in the invitation for bids. "In such cases the bid is considered to be nonresponsive
because it fails to respond precisely to the invitation for bids." NASH & CIBINIC 239. Nonresponsive bids are not considered for award because they give the bidder a competitive
advantage. Id. at 240.
" See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Byrne Org'n, Inc.
v. United States, 287 F.2d 582 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
" See note 18 infra, and accompanying text.
"'See note 69 infra, and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
"'See, e.g., Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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issue."8 Most state courts have dispensed with highly technical rules and generally grant standing to any party who has in fact suffered injury as a result of
agency action.19 The federal courts, however, have created a morass of rules
relating to standing in suits against the Government and its agencies and now
find it practically impossible to achieve consistency among them."0 The traditional federal rule is that a bidder has no standing to challenge the award of a
public contract to a competitor. The landmark decision denying unsuccessful
bidders standing to contest the validity of federal government contract awards
is Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,"' decided in 1940. Certain steel companies who
wished to contract with the Government challenged an administrative requirement that they comply with a minimum wage determination which they asserted to be unauthorized by statute. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs
had no standing because the statutes under which they sought relief conferred
no enforceable legal rights upon them. The Court stated that: "Respondents,
to have standing in court, must show an injury or threat to a particular right
of their own, as distinguished from the public's interest in the administration
of the law."2 The Court also held that no legal rights of the steel companies
had been violated because "the Government enjoys the unrestricted power...
to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions
upon which it will make needed purchases."" If anyone was harmed by the
violation of such regulations, it was the Government (the public) rather than
the prospective contractor. Thus, the disappointed bidder was denied standing
either because the agency was acting within the scope of its statutory discretion
to award the contract to a competitor or because an abuse of discretion created
"8The issue of standing concerns "whether the person whose standing is challenged is
a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue
itself is justiciable." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
193 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 291-92 (1958).
20 Id. It is not the purpose of this Comment to detail the long and complicated history of the federal rule on standing to challenge administrative actions. Early Supreme
Court cases on standing developed the "legal right" doctrine. A plaintiff is without standing
unless "the right invaded is a legal right, one of property, one arising out of contract, one
protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege."
Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939). The "legal right" doctrine was later the basis of the denial of standing to prospective bidders on federal government contracts to contest the award of such contracts. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310
U.S. 113 (1940). Other cases granted standing in somewhat similar situations, resulting in
a good deal of confusion and complexity in the law of standing. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), holding that even though an existing radio station lacked a legal right, it had standing to challenge an FCC order granting a certificate
to a new competitor station. The court in Sanders held that Congress could authorize, by
statute, suits by parties injured in fact by agency action. An extension of the Sanders doctrine was the idea that Congress could authorize private parties aggrieved by agency action
to bring suit in the public interest. A plaintiff having "a private substantive legally protected interest" may be authorized by Congress "to vindicate the interest of the public" and
thus serve as a private attorney general. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d
Cir.), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). For a discussion of the concept of standing
see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 419-39 (1972); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE 208-94 (1958); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION 395-423 (hereinafter cited as JAFFE]. See also Berger, Standing To Sue in Public
Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450 (1970); Comment, Standing To Secure
Judicial Review of Administrative Action-A New Direction, 37 J. AIR L. & COM. 117
(1971).
21310

U.S. 113 (1940).

22
5 Id. at 125.

1d. at 127.
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a legal wrong suffered by the Government, not the bidder. In either case, the
invasion of a legal right of the bidder, a requisite of standing, was absent.
The Court also emphasized the pragmatic considerations behind its refusal
to grant standing. The Court pointed out that courts should not "subject purchasing agencies . . . to the delays necessarily incident to judicial scrutiny at
the instance of potential sellers. . . . [A similar restraint on private industry)
would be widely condemned as an intolerable handicap."2 The Court recognized that "[ilt is . . . essential to the even and expeditious functioning of
Government that the administration of the purchasing machinery be unhampered."'" Thus, the necessity of avoiding interference with the smooth
functioning of the federal procurement program was articulated as a basis for
denial of standing to bidders.
The first cautious departure from Perkins came in Heyer Products Co. v.
United States" in 1956. The plaintiff alleged that the contract award had been
made contrary to the statutory mandate that "[alwards shall be made . . . to
the responsible bidder whose bid conforms to the invitation and will be most
advantageous to the United States, price and other factors considered."" The
plaintiff sued for both bid preparation costs and lost profits. The fact that the
contract was awarded to a bidder whose bid was higher than six others and
twice as high as the low bidder made the court "strongly suspect discrimination
and favoritism" 8 and a failure to follow the statutorily required bid procedure.
Despite these suspicions, the court refused to award damages for lost profits."
The decision was based on the Perkins rationale that procurement statutes were
enacted for the benefit of the public and not for individual bidders. If they were
violated, "it is only the public who has a cause for complaint, and not an unsuccessful bidder." It was held, however, that the plaintiff had standing to
sue and recover its bid preparation costs, since the Government has an implied
obligation to consider fairly and honestly all bids submitted. This implied contract theory was narrowly limited to cases in which there was a fraudulent
inducement for bids, with a premeditated intent to reject all the bids except the
bid of a particular contractor "whether he was the lowest responsible bidder
or not."2 1 The court, in allowing the recovery of bid preparation costs, departed
from Perkins in that it interposed the obligations of commercial good faith
and fair dealing as limitations on the otherwise complete discretion of contracting officers in making awards.
The Heyer decision proved to be little help to plaintiffs seeking recovery
241d.

at 130.

2S Id.

140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
S 2305(c)
(1971).
28 140 F. Supp. at 410.
9
" The Government "could accept or reject an offer as it pleased, and no contract resulted until an offer was accepted. Hence, an unsuccessful bidder cannot recover the profit
he would have made out of the contract, because he had no contract." Id. at 412.
21

2710 U.S.C.

30 Id.

31 Id. at 414.
92 Even though the departure from the Perkins rationale was slight, the case aroused
considerable interest. See, e.g., Note, Bid on Government Contract Held To Give Implied
Rights Not Included in Statute, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1239 (1956); 70 HARv. L. REV. 564
(1957); 41 MINN. L. REv. 373 (1957); 11 Sw. L.J. 521 (1957).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

of bid preparation expenses in subsequent cases.' The federal courts generally
continued to apply the rigid rule denying standing to a defeated bidder.34 It
was not until 1970 that the District of Columbia Circuit Court in Scanwell
Laboratories,Inc. v. Shaffer,' in a dramatic break with tradition, granted aggrieved bidders standing to enter the judicial arena. In Scanwell the Federal
Aviation Administration had issued an invitation for bids (IFB) for instrument landing systems to be installed at airports. The contract was awarded to
the lowest bidder; Scanwell, the second lowest bidder, challenged the award
on the grounds that the lowest bid was not responsive to the IFB.0 Scanwell
argued that the FAA, in awarding the contract to a non-responsive bidder, had
acted in violation of the statutory provisions governing the award of contracts.
Scanwell was thus entitled to standing as a "person . . . aggrieved by agency
action" within the meaning of section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). 7
The Government relied heavily on Perkins to support its position. The court
viewed this reliance as "ill-founded,"'" pointing out that "Perkins was decided
during the heyday of the legal right doctrine, and before the passage of the
Administrative Procedure Act."' 9 The court concluded that a 1952 amend" See Robert F. Simmons & Associates v. United States, 360 F.2d 962 (Ct. Cl. 1966);
Trans Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 351 F.2d 1001 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Green Manor
Constr. Co. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 413 (1965); Iscow v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl.
875 (1963); Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 149 Ct. Cl. 837 (1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 815 (1961); Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 251 (Ct. Cl. 1959); cf.
Continental Business Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 452 F.2d 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1971);
Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970). One writer remarked
that "the fate of those bidders who sought to gain standing under . . . [the Heyer) holding
. . . made the Heyer case in retrospect more aberrational than trendsetting." Comment, The
Erosion of the Standing Impediment in Challenges by Disappointed Bidders of FederaA
Government Contract Awards, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 103, 113 (1970).
'See, e.g., Edelman v. FHA, 382 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1967); Lind v. Staats, 289 F.
Supp. 182 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Department of Interior, 160 F.
Supp. 417 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
S424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). There were a few cases prior to Scanwell representing a departure from the Perkins rationale, notably Superior Oil Co. v. Udall, 409 F.2d 1115,
dismissed sub nom. by agreement, Superior Oil Co. v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 1089 (D.C. Cir.
1969). However, none of these decisions expressly held that unsuccessful bidders have standing to sue for cancellation of a government contract not awarded in conformance with the
procedure prescribed by statute and regulation. The court in Superior Oil enjoined the government agency involved from awarding an oil lease to the plaintiff-bidder's competitor,
but it did not specifically discuss the issue of standing. However, the court in Scanwell
stated that the court in Superior Oil "[iln allowing that suit without denying standing to
Superior Oil because it was a competitive bidder for a government contract . . . impliedly
held that such persons have standing to sue in the event the contract is illegally awarded."
424 F.2d at 869. See also Gonzales v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964), and Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961), both granting
standing to challenge the Comptroller General's actions in "blacklisting" or debarring certain contractors from doing business with the Government. For a critical analysis of the
role of the Comptroller General in government contracts see Cibinic & Lasken, The Comptroller and Government Contracts, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 349 (1970).
" Since a prime goal of the FAA here was safety, the IFB criteria precluded bids from
contractors who did not have an operational system already installed and tested in at least
one location. Scanwell argued that the low bid was nonresponsive because the low bidder
did not have such a system installed in one location, and because it did not have a certificate
of performance based on an FAA flight check, another requirement of the IFB. 424 F.2d
at 860.
275 U.S.C. § 702 (1971). This section provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action . . . within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof."
8424
F.2d at 867.
9
Id. at 866.
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ment 0 to the Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act 4' shows that "the basic approach of the Supreme Court in the Perkins case has been legislatively reversed
by the Congress ..... The court held that Scanwell had standing as a "person
aggrieved" under section 10 of the APA, and that the infringement of a
"legal right" was no longer a prerequisite of standing. The court concluded
that "in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet chosen to hold that
the Administrative Procedure Act applies to all situations in which a party
who is in fact aggrieved seeks review, regardless of a lack of legal right or
specific statutory language, it is clearly the intent of that Act that this should
be the case."4 Thus, any bidder who makes a prima facie showing of arbitrary
or capricious abuse of discretion on the part of an agency has standing to sue
under the provisions of section 10 of the APA."
The court also discussed the theory of the "private attorney general" as a
basis for standing. This theory permits standing to an individual to vindicate
the public interest in having government agencies follow the statutes and
regulations which' control government contracting.' The court stated that the
"essential thrust " of Scanwell's claim was to satisfy such a public interest,
since Scanwell had no right to have the contract awarded to it even if the
district court were to find the contract to have been illegally awarded. The
court reasoned that "[i]f there is arbitrary or capricious action on the part of
any contracting official, who is going to complain about it, if not the party
denied a contract as a result of the alleged illegal activity? It seems to us that
it will be a very healthy check on governmental action to allow such suits
.. .., The court thus opened the door to frustrated bidders, as "private
attorneys general," to vindicate their own interests because of their service to
the public interest in policing governmental action.48
Even though the question may yet be open, Scanwell seems to have replaced Perkins in the law of standing for defeated bidders. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the
Scanwell holding as to standing." Numerous other lower federal courts across
U.S.C. § 43(a) (1971).
4141 U.S.C. §§35-45 (1971).
'424 F.2d at 867.

4041

Id.
"Id. at 869.
4

4'The court quoted with approval from the concurring opinion in National Ass'n of
Secs. Dealers, Inc. v.SEC, 420 F.2d 83, 96 (1969), the idea that "the basic justification for
entertaining competitor's suits to challenge administrative action as statutory aggrieved
parties . . .is to vindicate a public interest, and not a private right." 424 F.2d at 870.
4424 F.2d at 864.
I Id. at 866-67.
4'For a critical analysis of the Scanwell concept of the "private attorney general," see
Pierson, Standing To Seek Judicial Review of Government Contract Awards: Its Origins,
Rationale and Effect on the Procurement Process, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1, 14, 15

(1970).

"'E.g., A.G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 445 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971); M. Steinthal
& Co. v. Seamans, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,781 (D.C. Cit. Oct. 14, 1971); Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,780 (D.C. Cit. Oct. 14, 1971); Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cit. 1970); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing
Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cit. 1970). See also National Cash Register Co. v.
Richardson, 324 F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1971); Northeast Constr. Co. v. Romney, 16 CCH
Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,459 (D.D.C. June 21, 1971); Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v.
Resor, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,313 (D.D.C. 1971); Lombard Corp. v. Resor, 321 F.
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the nation have adopted Scanwell as precedent on the issue." The Supreme
Court has not yet considered the continued vitality of Perkins. Two recent
Supreme Court decisions rendered subsequent to Scanwell, however, seem to
lend additional weight to its value as precedent.
The two cases are Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
2 The Data Processing case was a comInc. v. Camp' and Barlow v. Collins."
petitor's suit. Sellers of data processing services challenged a ruling of the
Comptroller of Currency that national banks may make data processing services available to other banks and to bank customers. On the issue of whether
the seller-petitioners had standing to challenge the Comptroller's action, the
Court held that these sellers did have standing and went on to specifically
reject the old test of a recognized "legal interest. '"'s To replace it were two
new tests. The first, constitutionally based on article III, was "injury in fact,
economic or otherwise."' 4 The basic test of standing is whether an article III
case or controversy exists." If the party seeking review can show injury in fact,
the first test is satisfied.'" The second was the "zone of interests" test. To meet
the requirements of this second test, the party must show that the interest
which he seeks to protect is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected" by the statute which he alleges has been violated."
In Barlow the issue was whether tenant farmers eligible for payments under
the federal upland cotton program had standing to challenge an amended
regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture. The program, prior
to the amended regulation, precluded assignments by farmers of their crops
for the payment of cash rent on a farm. The new regulation permitted assignSupp. 687 (D.D.C. 1970); Keco Indus., Inc. v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1970);
Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970).
"E.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan. 1971); Continental Business Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 452 F.2d 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Keco
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Also, opinions as yet unreported, e.g., Hayes Int'l Corp. v. Seamans, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,830 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 30, 1971); Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5
83,786 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Big Four Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. SBA, 15 CCH Cont.
Cas. F. 5 83,766 (W.D. Okla. 1970). Two of the circuits, however, purport to have reserved decision on whether Perkins is still the law. Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood
Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1971); Hi-Ridge Lumber Co. v. United States, 15
CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,476 (9th Cir. 1971).
1397 U.S. 150 (1970).
2 397 U.S. 159 (1970). For a discussion of both Data Processing and Barlow see Davis,
The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. C4. L. REV. 450 (1970).
"The Court quoted the remark from Tennessee Electric, see note 20 supra, about a
"legal interest," and rejected it, saying: "The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits. The
question of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the 'case' or 'controversy' test, the
question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question." 397 U.S. at 153. The Court in a footnote emphasized that "the existence or
non-existence of a 'legal interest' is a matter quite distinct from the problem of standing."
Id. n.1.
4
Id. at 152.
5"Id. at 151.
"The petitioners here alleged the loss of two customers to their new competitor, a national bank, and the Court recognized this as a showing of injury in fact. Id. at 152.
'1Id.
at 157. The Court held that petitioners met the "zone of interests" test. The remaining question for the Court to decide was whether judicial review of the Comptroller's
decision had been precluded by statute. The Court held that judicial review had not been
precluded, and that the "petitioners, as competitors of national banks which are engaging
in data processing serivces, are clearly within that class of 'aggrieved' persons who .
are entitled to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 157.
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ments of crops for payment of cash rent for farming land. The tenant farmers
objected to the new regulation because it allegedly allowed landlords to compel
them to obtain all their financing for farm needs from the landlords, since
the farmer's major source of credit was exhausted by the assignment. The landlords allegedly charged such high prices and rates of interest that the tenants'
profits each year were consumed by debt payments.
The Supreme Court held that the tenants had standing because they had
"the personal stake and interest which impart the concrete adverseness required by Article III." The tenants also were "clearly within the zone to be
protected by the Act."58 The court further held that the case was not unreviewable because precluded by statute or committed to agency discretion.59
The second requirement of the Data Processing and Barlow cases, the "zone
of interests" test, has been criticized." It was suggested in a concurring opinion
to these two cases that this second test be abandoned in favor of a single test
based on "injury in fact.""t Cases decided subsequent to Data Processing and
Barlow have upheld the standing of disappointed bidders on government contracts without an analysis showing that the "zone of interests" test had been
satisfied. These cases indicate that the test may be easily met, and perhaps
even indicate that it is not really a requirement of standing for bidders."5 One
5

1d. at 164.
"Id. at 165-66. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1971) allows
judicial review of challenged agency action except where "(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." See note 80 infra,
and accompanying text.
8"397 U.S. at 167-68 (concurring opinion). See also Davis, supra note 52. Professor
Davis suggests that the test of "zone of interests" has several faults: (1) The test is analytically faulty; by requiring that the plaintiff's interest be within the zone of interests "to
be protected" by the statute or constitutional guarantee it "ignores the need for continuing
common-law protection of some interests." Id. at 458. The test is also analytically faulty
because the requirement "to be . . . regulated," if literally interpreted, would preclude
standing for a plaintiff injured by regulation which was without statutory authorization
(for example, if the plaintiff could not show that he is "to be" regulated). (2) The test
is contrary to many prior cases which the Court obviously did not intend to overrule.
(3) The test is cumbersome and artificial, because it is often difficult or practically impossible to determine whether a statute was meant to protect a specific interest asserted by
a particular plaintiff. (4) The test is contrary to the intent of Congress in enacting the
APA. The intent was that any person "injured in fact" should be granted standing. Thus,
"injury in fact" should be the sole test of standing. These views are also expressed in K.
DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 22.07 (1972).
1 Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice White, concurred in the result and dis-

sented as to the holding on standing:
My view is that the inquiry in the Court's first step [injury in fact] is the only
one that need be made to determine standing. I had thought we discarded the
notion of any additional requirement where we discussed standing solely in
terms of its constitutional content in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
By requiring a second, non-constitutional step, the Court comes very close to
perpetuating the discredited requirement that conditioned standing on a showing by the plaintiff that the challenged governmental action invaded one of
his legally protected interests.
397 U.S. at 168 (concurring opinion):
" E.g., Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Blackhawk
Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For a good discussion
of the Ballerina and Blackhawk cases see Pierson, supra note 48, at 18-24. Many cases upholding standing for bidders have merely followed Scanwell without making an analysis
showing that the "zone of interests" test had been satisfied. E.g., A.G. Schoonmaker Co.
v. Resor, 445 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Gould, Inc. v. Chafee, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F.
5 80,499 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1971); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650
(10th Cir. 1971); Northeast Constr. Co. v. Romney, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,459
(D.D.C. June 21, 1971); Continental Business Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 452 F.2d
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of the most significant post-Scanwell cases is Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig,3
which rearticulated the requirements for standing of bidders. Ballerina interpreted Data Processing and Barlow to require a three-fold test of standing for
bidders: "[1] First, the party must allege that the challenged action has
caused him injury in fact .... [2] The plaintiff must further allege that the
agency has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in excess of statutory authority so
as to injure an interest that is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question ....
[3] Finally, there must be no 'clear and convincing' indication of a legislative
intent to withhold judicial review.""
It should be noted that Data Processing required, as the second test of standing, that "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected .. . ."" Thus, it appears that the
court in Ballerina equated "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant" with the plaintiff's allegation that the agency acted arbitrarily,
capriciously, or in excess of its statutory authority. Ballerina suggests that if
the congressional purpose underlying procurement statutes would be thwarted
by the arbitrary and capricious actions of government officials, the court should
allow defeated bidders, who are injured by such actions, standing to sue because they have interests parallel to those of Congress. Therefore, the interests
of bidders may be considered within the "zone of interests" to be protected by
statute, even though Congress did not intend to enact the particular statute to
protect the interests of those particular bidders. The Scanwell idea of "private
attorneys general" thus seems intimately related to standing requirements for
bidders, and it is questionable whether standing for bidders could be achieved
without that concept." Scanwell held that a bidder for a government contract
who makes a prima facie showing of illegality in the manner by which a
contract is awarded has standing to seek judicial review of the agency's action.
Under the Scanwell rationale, it would seem that the only two requirements
of standing for bidders should be that the plaintiff show injury in fact and a
1016 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970);
cf. Pullman, Inc. v. Volpe, No. 71-2442 (E.D. Pa. 1971), which denied standing to an unsuccessful bidder because the plaintiff did not show that the interest which he sought to
vindicate was within the zone of interests intended to be protected by a particular statute.
In that case, however, the plaintiff was challenging a procurement by a state rather than
a federal agency. The court held that none of the federal statutes or regulations involved
evidenced any intent by Congress to protect the individual interests of a disappointed bidder
where the procurement was made by a state agency.
63433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"Id. at 1207.
's 397 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
"This is indicated by Scanwell and Ballerina, as well as the statement by the D.C. Circuit that standing in Scanwell was grounded on the two interrelated principles of a "party
aggrieved" under § 10 of the APA and the concept of "private attorneys general." M. Steinthai & Co. v. Seamans, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,781, at 85,805 n.2 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14,
1971). One commentator, in discussing Scanwell, stated: "Employing the belt and suspenders technique, Judge Tamm gave several reasons to support the standing holding, any
one of which presumably would have been adequate by itself. His opinion does not make
dear, however, which of the several rationale is intended to be controlling." Address by
William Munves, Deputy General Counsel of the Air Force, at the Southwestern Legal
Foundation Eleventh Annual Institute on Government Contracts, Dallas, Texas, Nov. 4,
1971 (unpublished). The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia has not yet made
clear whether one rationale is controlling.
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prima facie case of illegality on the part of procurement officials. Regardless
of the nature of the requirements of the second test, the third test enunciated
by Ballerina should not be a requirement for standing. The third test, that
there is no legislative intent to withhold judicial review, should properly go
to the question of reviewability rather than to standing.'
A more manageable and understandable delineation of the specific test or
tests for standing of bidders must await future judicial decisions. However, one
proposition seems fairly certain: Regardless of the specific articulation of the
test of standing, Scanwell and its progeny clearly hold that disappointed bidders may have standing to sue. The Supreme Court could, of course, reverse
these cases, but such a holding seems unlikely in light of its recent decisions
on standing." Thus, the question of the bidder's standing, which once was the
greatest stumbling block to allowing judicial redress for defeated bidders, is
no longer a bar to judicial review.
II. AVAILABILITY OF REVIEW-REVIEWABILITY AND
SCOPE OF REVIEW

The availability of judicial review of administrative action involves two
considerations-reviewability and scope of review. The first phase of availability of review concerns whether or not a particular issue is subject to judicial
review, and may be called reviewability. "' The second phase of availability
of review concerns how much review is to be given on a particular issue which
is subject to judicial review. This second phase is customarily discussed as
scope of review. Actually, reviewability and scope are interrelated. Whether or
not a court will determine that a particular issue or matter is reviewable may
well be decisively influenced by the scope of review that will be given if review
is made available."0
Review on the merits may be precluded by a number of judicially developed
doctrines of nonreviewability. The doctrine of standing operates to deny review
to a particular plaintiff if he is not a proper party to litigate a particular issue.
The doctrines of ripeness 1 and exhaustion of administrative remedies,"' although not literally doctrines of nonreviewability, operate like standing to
deny review for failure to bring suit at the proper time. The doctrines of
sovereign immunity, 3 non-justiciability of political questions," and separation
of powers " are frequently the basis for denying review. Review may also be
denied under the Administrative Procedure Act because precluded by statute
67As the Ballerina court points out in a footnote: "This criterion [of legislative intent
to preclude review] is sometimes regarded as involving the question of 'reviewability'
rather than 'standing' . . . but the two concepts are not always sharply distinguished." 433
F.2d at 1207 n.6.
6 See notes 51, 52 supra, and accompanying text. See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
61 Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative
Process,
28 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 11-14 (1959).

70 Id.

"See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 396-418 (1972); JAFFEE 395-423.
" See authorities cited note 71 supra.
'3See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 69-72
(1970).
71 Id. at 46-48.
"Id. at 49-50.
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or "committed to agency discretion." Unfortunately, courts often confuse the
issues of standing, reviewability, and review on the merits." Perhaps this is
due to the fact that matters relevant to the merits already have been tangentially considered in the determination of standing, and often in the determination
of reviewability. To be entitled to standing, the plaintiff must prove the
existence of injury in fact, which necessitates a consideration of some relevant
aspects of the merits. A consideration of the merits is also necessary to establish
reviewability in cases where the plaintiff's right to review is dependent upon
evidence that his class is a statutory beneficiary." In addition, the merits must
be considered to determine reviewability of challenged actions which are allegedly "committed to agency discretion" under the APA.
Disappointed bidders on federal government contracts were denied review
under the Perkins rationale because they lacked standing. Although defeated
bidders now have standing under Scanwell, they may be denied review because of the judicial doctrines of non-reviewability, or because review is precluded under the provisions of the APA. A defeated bidder who overcomes
these obstacles and is granted review on the merits must then contend with a
rather narrowly limited scope of review. This section will discuss the problems
of reviewability and scope of review which are faced by bidders seeking
judicial review of contracting agency action.
A. Reviewability
Section 10(c) of the APA provides that "[algency action made reviewable
by statute and final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a
court are subject to judicial review."" Section 10 provides two exceptions to
this statute. "This chapter applies ... except to the extent that-( 1) statutes
preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discre-

tion by law."" Thus, the statutory exceptions lead to two reasons for not reviewing a matter: legislative intent to cut off review, and a finding that the
issue is inappropriate for judicial determination because it is "committed to
agency discretion."" To determine whether these exceptions are applicable,
courts must examine pertinent statutory language, legislative history, and considerations of public policy.
Initial Post-Scanwell Attempts To Limit the Extent and Function of Judicial
Review. In Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig"' the court recognized that once
7"For a discussion of this problem see Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167-78 (1970)
(concurring opinion).
"Id. at 175.
765 U.S.C. S 704 (1971).
795 U.S.C. § 701 (1971).
8°The doctrine of "committed to agency discretion" does not make an agency action
absolutely unreviewable. "As with all doctrines of non-reviewability, the committed-toagency-discretion doctrine is subject to limitations: it usually yields to nonfrivolous constitutional claims such as those of deprivation of property or liberty without due process,
and to contentions that the administrator acted beyond his jurisdiction or in violation of
a clear statutory duty." Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed
to Agency Discretion," 82 HARv. L. REV. 367, 369-70 (1968). See also K. DAVIS, AD-

§ 28.12-.15 (1958).
81433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cit. 1970). Some of the public policy considerations under-
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standing is given to aggrieved bidders, there must exist "adequate safeguards
to insure that there will be no incursion of frivolous lawsuits which will flood
the courts with unnecessary litigation. We think that such safeguards are
provided by the criteria established in Scanwell Laboratories.,"" The problem
of a possible inundation of suits by bidders received further attention in Black5
Apparently realizing the reality of
hawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver."
the potential flood of cases, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
attempted to remedy the problem they brought upon themselves with Scanwell
by narrowing the floodgates via summary judgment. The court in effect stated
that under Scanwel14 the plaintiff had standing to litigate, but the court could
have properly given a summary judgment for the defendant if all the requirements of a summary judgment had been met."
Blackhawk was followed by an interesting case from the district court for
the District of Columbia, Simpson Electric Co. v. Seamans.' At the outset the
court emphasized the uncertainty which immediately followed Scanwell. While
the Scanwell decision settled the question of standing, it did not specify the
scope of review or the scope of relief to be applied by the district courts. In
Simpson Electric the court declined to exercise its discretion to grant a mandatory injunction since the plaintiffs could obtain adequate relief through a suit
for damages in the Court of Claims. The court stated that the scope of review
on bid protests is narrow, and that "once the rights of the litigants are declared,
the Government should in the normal case be free to make choices as to
whether it will run the risk of damages, open the contract for rebidding, resolve the dispute by negotiation, or meet its needs ...

in some other fashion."8

The court further emphasized that "[the variety and complexity of situations
that will be presented make it abundantly apparent that in the usual case
courts have only a limited function in this area."8
A district court case in which the plaintiff was successful in overcoming the
case dealt primarily with standing. The court stated that "in an era when, as the 'fourth
branch of government,' the administrative agencies may well have a more far-reaching
effect on the daily lives of all citizens than do the combined actions of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, the necessity for a legal means of piercing the glittering
carapace of agency determinations to insure that they do not conceal congressionally unauthorized action is obvious." Id. at 1208.
82Id. at 1209. The court stated that criteria established by Scanwell were: (1) injury
in fact, (2) case or controversy under art. III, and (3) otherwise reviewable subject matter.
83433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
84The district court decision was prior to Scanwell.
8 The court stated that it was inclined to enter summary judgment in favor of the defendant, but it did not for the reason that the opinion of the district court revealed that
some of the documents and information contemplated by rule 56 were not tendered in
the case. The court reversed and remanded, with instructions that all parties have an opportunity to present the necessary relevant information, and that summary judgment be entered in favor of the defendants unless it appears to the trial judge that there is a genuine
issue as to material fact.
88 317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970).
Id. at 688.
88 Id. (emphasis added). At this point a trend to limit the function of judicial review
of procurement activities began to become apparent. Lombard Corp. v. Resor, 321 F. Supp.
687 (D.D.C. 1971), followed the lead of Blackhawk and granted a summary judgment for
the defendant. Lombard was an action by a low bidder for injunctive relief and for a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to be awarded a contract. The court rejected the
Government's contention that suit was barred by sovereign immunity. The court relied on
the holding in Scanwell that the enactment of the APA evidenced an "intention on the
part of Congress to waive the right of sovereign immunity." 321 F. Supp. at 693.
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problem of nonreviewability because "committed to agency discretion" was
9
which dealt with a contract termination.
National Helium Corp. v. Morton,"

Plaintiffs were awarded contracts for extraction and sale of helium to the
federal government pursuant to the National Helium Act. The contract provided that the Government could terminate the contract at any time if "in the

opinion of the Secretary [circumstances] should occur which would make the
continued operation of seller's plant and the continued purchase of [helium]
unnecessary to accomplish the purposes of the act ... ."° The plaintiffs sued
for an injunction restraining the Secretary of Interior from cancelling the
contract pending hearing on the merits. The court granted standing under
Scanwell, and granted a temporary injunction because plaintiffs made a sufficient showing of irreparable harm and probability of success on the merits.
Although this case involved a suit on a contract cancellation rather than a
suit by an unsuccessful bidder, it is informative because of its discussion relating to reviewability. The court held that the challenged action did not come
within the exception of actions unreviewable because "committed to agency
discretion." The court stated that only when there "is no law to apply due to
the fact that the statute conferring authority upon the Secretary is extremely
broad, will this exception preclude judicial review.""
The broad authority delegated to an administrative agency was also instrumental in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hi-Ridge Lumber Co. v. United
States."' The court articulated some of the considerations relevant to a determination of whether agency action is committed to agency discretion under
section 10: "Lacking specific legislative instruction as to the availability of
judicial review, the court must balance the need for speedy and efficient enforcement of Congressional programs and the growing demands on judicial
resources against an individual's interest in having a claim adjudicated.". The
court recognized that the test of reviewability under section 10 cannot be
merely whether the agency possesses some discretion under the controlling
law. The court noted that almost every agency action involves some discretion,
but this does not mean that every agency action is unreviewable. 4 The problem,
then, is determining when agency action is "committed to agency discretion"
within the meaning of section 10 of the APA, as opposed to when it merely
involves discretion which is nevertheless reviewable.
The court concluded that it would not review the defendant's action in
rejecting all bids submitted. The court said that there were compelling reasons
which justified nonreview because the challenged action was committed to
agency discretion. First, the authority delegated by the statutes and regulations
was quite broad. The court had no standards or criteria by which to review the
rejection of all bids, and the "development of such criteria and factors to be
weighed would be too onerous a burden upon this or any court."9 Second, the
11326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan.), afl'd, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
"0326 F. Supp. at 152-53.
91
1d. at 154.
g 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,476 (9th Cir. 1971).
3
1d. at 85,583.
"The court quoted its earlier decision in Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964).
16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. at 85,583.
1116 CCH Cont. Cas. F. at 85,584.
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decision required a technical expertise which the court did not possess." In
addition, the court implied something akin to a failure to exhaust administrative remedies by its statement that "the Forest Service appeals procedures
provide a fair and expeditious forum in which dissatisfied participants in the
bidding may lodge their protests and have them fully considered.""7
The Fifth Circuit emphasized the importance of administrative expertise as
a factor in judicial nonreviewability in Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood
Construction Co." The Allen M. Campbell Company was the low bidder on a
government construction contract set aside under the Small Business Act for
award to a "small business" as determined by the Small Business Administration
(SBA) under applicable regulations. The second lowest bidder, Lloyd Wood
Construction Company, protested the award administratively on the theory
that Campbell was not a "small business" under the applicable size standards
because its average annual receipts had been computed under a completed
contracts rather than a cash accounting method. The SBA determined that
Campbell met the size standards for a "small business," thus implicitly adopting
the "completed contracts" accounting method as a proper method for size
determination. Lloyd Wood then filed suit in the district court seeking declaratory relief voiding the SBA size determination and injunctive relief against
the award of the contract to Campbell. The district court invalidated the SBA
size determination, on the ground that the agency had based its determination
upon an improper accounting method. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed.
The court granted standing to Lloyd Wood on the basis of the SBA regulations
providing for bid protests."8 In considering the question of reviewability, the
court stated the axiom that "judicial review of an administrative agency's
interpretation of its own regulations must be accorded the greatest deference."'"
The court reasoned that when, as here, a determination incorporates quasitechnical expertise and familiarity with an administrative scheme and its
subject matter, judges should be especially reluctant to substitute their judgment for that determination. The court noted that "[clourts have not demonstrated any great competence in either discerning or applying the sometimes
esoteric mysteries of [the accounting] profession. It is better left to those
having, or thought to have, a business-experience-oriented expertise." '' The
court therefore reversed the district court's decision and upheld the SBA size
determination.
A Drastic Retreat From Judicial Intervention: Wheelabrator and Steinthal.
The most devastating blow to the defeated bidder's chances for judicial review
98"[Tlhe decision whether to award a specific contract in view of the Government's
need for revenue, management of timber and its roadbuilding needs, is one which is necessarily based upon some expertise in the financial and ecological management of our natural
resources. This court has neither the technical expertise nor the intuitive knowledge gained
from daily acquaintance with this subject to provide an informed review of executive deId.
cision-making."
97

1d.

98446 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1971).
9 The court declined to follow Scanwell, stating that it considers the question of standing for disappointed bidders in other contexts an open question. Id. at 264 n.5.
'oo
Id. at 265.
Id.
101
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came from the District of Columbia Circuit Court, in the companion cases of
Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee' °2 and M. Steinthal & Co., v. Seamans.1"3 These
cases suggest a drastic, if not complete, retreat from the judicial intervention
made possible by Scanwell. Although Scanwell extended standing to disappointed bidders, Wheelabratorand Steinthal deprived this new status of much
of its significance by making it more difficult to obtain review or relief on the
merits. Wheelabrator involved a Navy procurement of a portable ship hull
cleaning device. The Navy proceeded by "Two-Step Formal Advertising,"
under which bidders must first submit technical proposals without price quotations and then those bidders whose technical proposals are acceptable to the
procuring agency are invited to submit price bids. The plaintiff, Wheelabrator,
submitted three technical proposals, one of which was accepted by the Navy.
The plaintiff then protested to the Comptroller General, contending that the
contract should be awarded by sole source negotiation with the plaintiff rather
than by the "Two-Step Formal Advertising" method. Without awaiting the
Comptroller's decision, the Navy proceeded to the second step and issued an
invitation for bids to plaintiff and one other company, these two companies
being the only ones whose technical proposals were deemed acceptable by the
Navy.
The plaintiff refused to submit a bid on the ground that this method of
procurement was illegal because contrary to the relevant provisions of the
Armed Services Procurement Act' 4 and regulations thereunder." The district
court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Navy from opening
bids and awarding a contract. The district court found that the plaintiff had
developed a unique ship hull cleaning device, never previously purchased by
the Government, as a result of twelve years of research and development, on
which the plaintiff allegedly spent over $100,000, and which included demonstrations and consultations with Navy personnel. The district court held that
the award of the contract to the plaintiff's competitor would result in irreparable injury to the plaintiff through loss of investment, waste of acquired
technology and expertise, and abridgement of the right to a meaningful decision by the Comptroller General. The district court also concluded that the
plaintiff had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
The circuit court reversed on appeal, concluding that the pre-conditions for
the use of two-step formal advertising had been met.' °0 It further concluded
that the statutory and regulatory authority for negotiations was permissive
rather than mandatory, and the Government's discretionary decision not to
" 216 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,780 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 1971).
1 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,781 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 1971).
10410 U.S.C. § 2301-14 (1971).
10232 C.F.R.
2.501 to .503-2 (1971).
10 The Armed Services Procurement Regulations require as a pre-condition for the use
of two-step formal advertising the existence of definitive criteria for evaluating technical
proposals. ASPR 2-502(a) (2), 32 C.F.R. § 2.502(a) (2) (1972). The court held that
this requirement was met because the IFB contained a 2 0-page Purchase Description on
thinning the Government's needs. The court held that the use of admittedly broad performance requirements nevertheless met the definition of definitive criteria. Another ASPR
requirement as a pre-condition is that "[m]ore than one technically qualified source is expected to be available." ASPR 2-502(a) (3), 32 C.F.R. § 2.502(a) (3) (1972). The court
held that this requirement was also met because 37 potential suppliers were solicited, even
though only two acceptable bids were received. 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,780, at 85,799.

1972]

COMMENTS

negotiate cannot be challenged judicially because it is committed by law to
agency discretion. Thus, the court cannot order a procurement official to make
the discretionary decision to negotiate."' The court did indicate that, perhaps
in extreme circumstances, judicial review would be available. These extreme
circumstances would include cases in which there is a claim of fraud, bribery,
or the equivalent based on extrinsic facts, or in which the pleadings establish
on their face, without any reference to the administrative file, that the agency
action violates a clear command of governing law and lacks any conceivable
reasonable basis to justify the administrative action. The court then bolstered
its decision by adding that even if the decision not to negotiate could be subjected to judicial review, there was no abuse of discretion shown in this case
because the would-be sole source, (Wheelabrator) did not show that the
competition would result in excess cost to the Government or undue interference or delay with the procurement process.
An interesting question which the court mentioned but did not decide is how
the nature of the item under procurement affects reviewability. The court
recognized that the pertinent negotiation procurement statutes appear to address themselves to major procurements like tanks, missiles, and aircraft. It
could be argued that for purposes of reviewability, a distinction can be drawn
between major high priority items vital to the national defense, health, or
welfare, which are generally procured by negotiation, and those invoking
readily available commercial items, which are generally procured by formal
advertised bidding."8 The court also gave great deference to the opinion of
the Comptroller General, demonstrating a willingness to defer to the Government Accounting Office (GAO) of which the Comptroller General is the
head, in bid protests because of the GAO's expertise in that area."'
In M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans"' the court also emphasized the importance
in government procurement of the GAO."' The major thrust of the decision,
however, concerned the scope of review to be given to disappointed bidders
who challenge government contracts."" The court of appeals noted that in
post-Scanwell cases, it had "suggested the judicial responsibility to consider
carefully and attentively the peculiar circumstances of each case, with a view
towards limiting the instances of unnecessary judicial intervention into the
procurement process.""' The court stressed that in undertaking judicial review
of procurement agency action, the district courts must take account of the
strong public interest in avoiding disruptions in government procurement, and
must withhold "judicial interjection unless it clearly appears that the case
calls for an asserting of an overriding public interest 'in having agencies follow
the regulations which control government contracting."""
The court then focused on two interrelated principles which it deemed of
special importance in judicial review of procurement agency actions: "(1)
16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,780, at 85,800.
note 133 infra, and accompanying text.
109 See notes 195-97 infra, and accompanying text.
11016 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,781 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 1971).
" See note 194 infra, and accompanying text.
"'See notes 139, 140 infra.
...
16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,781, at 85,812.
"4 Id., citing Scanwell, 424 F.2d at 86.
107

108See
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courts should not overturn any procurement determination unless the aggrieved
bidder demonstrates that there was no rational basis for the agency's decision;
and (2) even in instances where such a determination is made there is room
for sound judicial discretion, in the presence of overriding public interest
considerations, to refuse to entertain declaratory or injunctive actions in a preprocurement context."'' . The court reiterated the salutary effect of Scanwell
in providing protection against illegal government action."' It cautioned, however, that Scanwell and its progeny also impose a responsibility upon courts
to exercise restraint in using the power to enjoin a procurement program.
Among the considerations that may cause a court to refrain from injunctive
relief are a realization of the Government's need for smooth and expeditious
functioning of the procurement process in general and short-delivery-time
procurements in particular, as well as the possibility of subsequent relief in
the form of damages for the bidder."'
Factors Influencing the Determination of Nonreviewability. From a review of
the preceding cases, it is readily apparent that there is no single factor which has
influenced the courts to grant or deny review. Rather there are a number of
factors which have appeared as influences in determining reviewability."' The
major factors relevant to nonreviewability seem to be: (1) the need for the
smooth and expeditious functioning of the procurement process;... (2) broad
(3) technical or quasi-technical
discretion in the procurement agency;
expertise required to understand the subject matter of agency action;... (4) the
potential flood of government contracts cases brought to the courts by disappointed bidders.' Some of these factors seem rather weak individually as a
basis for nonreviewability. The concern that courts may be flooded with cases,
which was mentioned in Scanwell, Ballerina, and Blackhawk, all primarily
dealing with the issue of standing, seems to be of much less concern to the
n1:ld. (emphasis added).
. The court stated that Scanwell, in allowing judicial challenges of procurement actions, "was salutory not only for the relatively few cases that might result in court intervention, but also for the greater number of cases which would be handled with greater
care and more diligence within the Government because of the awareness of the availability
of judicial scrutiny." Id.
..The court also gave a boost to the prestige of the GAO, stating that a court's reluctance to interfere with the procurement process should be particularly strong where the
GAO has made a determination on the merits upholding the procurement official's actions.
See note 194 infra, and accompanying text.
..See Saferstein, supra note 80.
M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,781 (D.C. Cir.
1'E.g.,
Oct. 14, 1971); Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,780 (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 14, 1971); Hi-Ridge Lumber Co. v. United States, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,476
(9th Cit. 1971).
"'E.g., Hi-Ridge Lumber Co. v. United States, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,476 (9th
Cit. 1971).
...
E.g., Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261 (5th Cit.
1971); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 80,781 (D.C. Cit. Oct. 14,
1971); Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,780 (D.C. Cit. Oct. 14,
1971); Hi-Ridge Lumber Co. v. United States, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,476 (9th Cit.
1971); Pullman, Inc. v. Volpe, No. 71-2442 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 14, 1971).
"'E.g., Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cit. 1970); Blackhawk
Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Other factors mentioned include the managerial nature of the agency and the existence of alternative methods
of review. See, e.g., Hi-Ridge Lumber Co. v. United States, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,476
(9th Cit. 1971).
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courts in later decisions. The reason is that through the increased use of summary judgment and doctrines of nonreviewability, the courts should be able to
stem any potential tide of cases. Many bidders who have standing to sue under
Scanwell will be denied relief by a summary judgment or the invocation of
the "committed to agency discretion" doctrine of nonreviewability under
section 10 of the APA. In addition, the narrow scope of review as stated in
Steinthal may contribute to the regulation of the number of cases. It would
seem that the use of summary judgment as a tool to exclude frivolous lawsuits and the probable effect of the narrow scope of review and doctrine of
"committed to agency discretion" in discouraging the institution of lawsuits
should be particularly effective in dispensing with the "flood of cases" argument as a basis for nonreviewability."'
The need for technical or quasi-technical expertise in the determination of
judicial disputes, as a basis of nonreviewability, is subject to criticism.'"
Although federal government contracting is admittedly a most complex area
of the law, it is not necessarily beyond the comprehension of the courts. In
fact, many judges have found themselves able to reach well-reasoned decisions
involving various fields of technical expertise. In Allen M. Campbell the
Fifth Circuit court stated that accounting is an esoteric field "better left to
those having ...a business-experience-oriented background. ' Yet the courts
all across the nation daily decide tax cases, securities cases, and corporate law
cases involving the esoteric mysteries of the accounting profession. Although
some government contract cases undoubtedly involve technical questions which
are beyond the present experience or knowledge of a particular court, many
do not. It would seem that those cases involving procedural fairness would be
an example of an area which does not require technical expertise." 6 Expertise
was heavily emphasized in Steinthal and Wheelabrator, and it appears that it
is here to stay as far as nonreviewability is concerned. Expertise, along with
broad discretion, seems to be a prerequisite to any determination of nonreviewability because the issue is "committed to agency discretion," but it is
questionable whether it can support such a finding by itself."7
Broad discretion seems inherent in any finding of "committed to agency
discretion." However, as the court in Hi-Ridge Lumber observed, the test of
reviewability under section 10 of the APA cannot be merely that the agency
possesses some discretion, but rather how much discretion it possesses." ' Al23See Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
cf. Saferstein, supra note 80, at 393: "Nor may it always be assumed that the delay even
for summary judgment will not be harmful to administrative efficiency."
12 "[U)nless we make the requirements of administrative action strict and demanding,
expertise . . .can become a monster which rules with no practical limits on its discretion."
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962) (emphasis in original),
quoting New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
11 446 F.2d at 265.
2'See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Gonzalez dealt
with a challenge to the Government's practice of "blacklisting" or barring certain contractors
from doing business with the Government. The court, in addition to granting standing on
the basis of the injury to the plaintiff contractors, extended the procedural safeguards of
notice and hearing to the disbarment action.
1'2 "Like broad discretion, expertise seems to be a prerequisite for even a prima facie
case of nonreviewability, but cannot itself support such a finding." Saferstein, supra note 80,
a: 384.
12 See text accompanying note 94 supra.
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though broad discretion seems necessary before even a prima facie case of
nonreviewability because "committed to agency discretion" can be made,' it
would seem that broad discretion should not be enough alone to put adminis 7
trative action beyond judicial review.13 °
The factor which seems to be the most influential policy reason for nonreviewability is the need for the smooth and expeditious functioning of the
procurement process. This factor was a major consideration in the Perkins...
case. The court of appeals which ignored the Supreme Court's opinion in
Perkins when deciding the Scanwell case is now reconsidering the wisdom of
that earlier case. The Wheelabrator and Steinthal cases place particular emphasis on the responsibility of the courts to avoid unnecessary interference
with the operation of government procurement. Injunctive relief may be
particularly disruptive to the procurement process. An interesting aspect of this
problem is suggested, but not discussed, by the Wheelabrator court."' Although injunctive relief may cause costly delays in government procurement,
the extent of possible adverse effects depends on the nature of the particular
procurement."
It is suggested that the primary ground upon which judicial nonreviewability of procurement agency action may be validly founded is the potential
disruption of the procurement process. Minimizing this potential disruption is
necessary to make judicial review for bidders a viable means of obtaining
relief. One method would be to draw a distinction based on the nature of the
procurement, that is, between negotiated and advertised procurements, or more
properly, between procurements in which the cost of interference or delay is
prohibitive in terms of money or damage to national goals, and procurements
in which interference or delay is not unduly onerous to the Government, the
successful bidder, and the protesting bidder. Unfortunately, this is at best only
a partial solution, and the courts presently do not seem inclined to make such
distinctions. Instead, the courts seemingly are developing, around the "committed to agency discretion" exception of the APA, a doctrine of nonreviewability which makes judicial review of procurement extremely difficult to
secure for any bidder on a federal government contract. The Wheelabrator
opinion establishes that there are certain discretionary procurement decisions
that are nonreviewable because "committed to agency discretion," and the
20Saferstein, supra note 80, at 380.

13

OSee generally Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965
(1969).
1 See text accompanying notes 24, 25 supra.
"nSee text accompanying note 108 supra.
133 One writer, in discussing standing, has stated that in only a small portion of government contracts, usually those involving exceptionally large expenditures of public funds,
will delay resulting from judicial review substantially impair any national goal. Thus, cancellation of contracts for purchases of commercial goods through formal advertisement may
not be unduly onerous. Most items procured by the Government are not significantly involved with or essential to the defense, health, safety, or welfare of the nation and may
be promptly reprocured or completed by a different contractor in the event of a courtordered cancellation. Negotiated procurement, on the other hand, often involves military,
space, and other procurement items which are essential to the national interest and must be
completed on schedule or not at all. Pierson, note 48 supra, at 26, 27. There would thus
seem to be some basis for a distinction between bidders on negotiated and advertised con-

tracts.
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exceptions which the court hypothesizes are so restrictively defined as to make
those exceptional cases which are reviewable few indeed." '
B. Scope of Review
In addition to developing a doctrine of nonreviewability which often precludes review for disappointed bidders on federal government contracts, the
courts have limited the scope of review for those bidders who do obtain
judicial review. The district court for the District of Columbia made some of
the first efforts to establish restrictive standards for scope of review in order
to stem the tide of post-Scanwell cases. In Simpson Electric Co. v. Seamans 3'
the court issued a declaratory judgment that the award of a government contract had been conducted illegally. The court nevertheless refused to grant
injunctive relief, stating that the scope of review is narrow, and emphasizing
the limited function of the courts in reviewing contracting agency action."
The district court went a step further in the case of National Cash Register
Co. v,Richardson,"' holding that the federal courts should establish a requirement of proof of "flagrant disregard for the regularity of contracting procedures"'' 8 before intervening in the government procurement process at the
request of a defeated bidder.
The judicial efforts to place some practical limitations on the scope of review
culminated in Steinthal and Wheelabrator. The Steinthal opinion announced
a new test which probably sounds the death knell for a majority of aggrieved
bidders' suits. The new test for scope of review is that the court must "restrict
its inquiry to a determination of whether the procurement agency's decision
had a reasonable basis.""' The two interrelated principles which the court in
Steinthal found to be of special importance in judicial review of procurement
agency actions were a "rational basis" test for scope of review and a sound
judicial discretion to deny, for public policy reasons, declaratory or injunctive
relief in preprocurement actions. 4 ' The impact these standards will have on

government contract bid award protests is tremendous. There are almost no
contract awards that cannot, either before or after the fact, be justified on some
reasonable or rational basis. Thus, by narrowly defining the scope of review,
the courts are spared any potential flood of cases, since prospective plaintiffs
will soon discover that virtually anything the contracting officer did in awarding the contract will be upheld in court as long as there is any rational basis
for his actions.
III.

RELIEF ON THE MERITS

Since Scanwell, aggrieved actual and prospective bidders theoretically have
access to a broad range of equitable remedies, as well as to damages. Due to
the judicial development of nonreviewability because "committed to agency
"'See note 107 supra, and accompanying text.
"'317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970).
...
See notes 87, 88 supra, and accompanying text.
"'324 F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1971).
"'Id. at 921.
"'16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,781, at 85,812 (emphasis added).
4
"See text accompanying note 115 supra.
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discretion" and the "rational basis" test for the scope of review, most aggrieved bidders at present will probably be precluded from relief on the
merits. However, assuming that a defeated bidder were to get a plenary consideration of the merits of his case, he could be entitled to a temporary
restraining order, a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, or damages,
were he to prevail.
The equitable remedies of temporary restraining order and injunction are
often the most attractive remedies to the aggrieved bidder. The power of
courts to enjoin the Government's activities through the use of equitable relief is a power not possessed by the GAO, which has been the traditional
forum for bid protests. Temporary restraining orders may be obtained by a
party without giving notice to the adverse party, but to do so he must show by
affidavit or verified complaint that immediate and irreparable damage is likely
to result before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.' As a matter of
practice, some notice is usually given, although it is often short notice.14 Ex
parte temporary restraining orders expire after ten days unless extended by
the court for a like period. 4 ' In addition, a hearing for a subsequent preliminary
injunction must be held by the court at the earliest possible time.'" Temporary
restraining orders have been issued on an ex parte basis to stay the award or
performance of government contracts.'

On the other hand, the refusal of a district court to grant a temporary
restraining order has not meant that a preliminary injunction will automatically
be denied as well.' The standards for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
have been largely shaped by case law rather than the language of rule 65.
The preliminary injunction cannot be ex parte, and must withstand several
judicially-developed questions:
(1) Has the petitioner made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits?
(2) Has the petitioner shown that without the relief requested it will
be irreparably injured?
(3) Would the issuance of an injunction substantially harm other
parties interested in the proceedings?
(4) Where does the public interest lie?""
The permanent, mandatory injunction is also governed by rule 65. As with
equitable remedies generally, the permanent injunction may be granted only
if the plaintiff can show irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at law.'4 "
R. Civ. P. 65.
" Address by William Munves, supra note 66.
14 FED. R. CIv. P. 65.
141FED.

144Id.

" Address by William Munves, supra note 66.

141
See, e.g., Northeast Constr. Co. v. Romney, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,459 (D.D.C.
June 21, 1971).
147Virginia Petroleum Jobbers v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958). This case has
been considered as controlling for the last decade, particularly in the District of Columbia
Circuit, where the majority of post-Scanwell cases have been brought. Address by William
Munves, supra note 66.
It has also been argued that a preliminary injunction should issue only if it will preserve, rather than change, the status quo. See Warner Bros. v. Gittone, 110 F.2d 292 (3d
Cir. 481940).
1 See Z. CHAFEE & E.RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY 795-817 (1967). As
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Another type of equitable relief is the
49 power of the court of appeals to enjoin
matters pending review on appeal.'
A. The Availability of Equitable Relief
Although equitable relief is theoretically available to defeated bidders, the
post-Scanwell cases indicate that the availability of such relief exists more in
theory than in reality. Immediately following Scanwell, a number of district
courts granted injunctive relief."' The trend since that time, however, has
been against injunctive interference, both in terms of the overturning of district court orders, and of an increasing reluctance of district courts to grant
injunctive relief."'
Four opinions of the district court of the District of Columbia were among
the first to deny injunctive relief. In Simpson Electric Co. v. Seamans,"" although the court held that the plaintiff was the proper awardee of the bid in
question, it determined that injunctive relief was inappropriate. Recognizing
their authority to require the Government to enter a contract or enjoin it
from proceeding with a contract, the court, nevertheless, seemed persuaded by
two reasons to deny injunctive relief: (1) adequate remedy at law (availability of damages), and (2) the interest of the Government in being free
to do its own contracting without interference from the courts."3
That same court denied injunctive relief in Keco Industries, Inc. v. Laird,'
in which an unsuccessful bidder on a negotiated procurement for air conditioning units sued the Government for a preliminary injunction which would
require it to halt all work on disputed contracts. The court stated that a
protest to the GAO is not a prerequisite to judicial review, and, also, that the
scope of review carries with it the authority to direct the award of a government contract and to exercise injunctive powers in appropriate circumstances.
The court recognized the beneficial purpose underlying Scanwell, i.e., the
protection of the integrity of the contract award system as established by
Congress, and found this purpose to be relevant to negotiated as well as adfor inadequate remedy at law, see also H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE
OF EQUITY 103-24 (2d ed. 1948).

PRINCIPLES

R. APP. P. 8.
"'319 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd, 446 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Hayes
Int'l Corp. v. Seamans (N.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 1971) (unreported; see 16 CCH Cont. Cas.
F. 5 80,830); Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Thiokol Corp. (N.D. Cal. 1970) (unreported; voluntarily dismissed; see 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 83,786); Big Four Mechanical Contractors,
Inc. v. SBA (W.D. Okla. 1970) (unreported; see 15 CCH Cont Cas. F. 5 83,766).
"'. Injunctions reversed: e.g., Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446
F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1971); A.G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 445 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir.
1971); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,781 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14,
1971); Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,780 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14,
1971); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Injunctive relief denied: e.g., Pullman, Inc. v. Volpe, No. 71-2442 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 14,
1971); American Standard, Inc. v. Laird, 326 F. Supp. 492 (D.D.C. 1971); National
Cash Register Co. v. Richardson, 324 F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1971); Lombard Corp. v.
Resor, 321 F. Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1970); Keco Indus., Inc. v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 1361
(D.D.C. 1970); Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970).
'317
F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970); see notes 86-88 supra, and accompanying text.
"'The court distinguished Superior Oil Co. v. Udall, 409 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
with perhaps the most important distinction being that the contract here had already been
awarded and performance had already begun. See notes 164-67 infra, and accompanying
149 FED.

text.
' 318 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1970).
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vertised procurements. The court, nevertheless, denied the injunction, stating
that "[slince procurement officials are allowed wider discretion in negotiated
procurement, the standard of review will differ from that used in advertised
procurement. Protection may be achieved by actions less than the directed
award of the contract and preliminary injunctive relief."1"' The court noted
that here the contract had already been awarded and performance had already begun. In this small, routine procurement the grant of an injunction
would not preserve the status quo but would, rather, alter it. The court found
that the benefits derived from the enforcement of the regulations of the procurement system may be outweighed by the liabilities incurred by the Government by way of both damages and the inconveniences of reprocurement.
Furthermore, the successful bidder, likely to suffer substantial loss in this
action, was not a party. "In this situation only very serious governmental irregularities will support injunctive relief."' 56 The court thus engaged in a
"balancing of equities" to determine whether such relief would be proper.
The court weighed the benefit to the plaintiff in its capacity as a private
attorney general against the harm to the defendant and found the equities to
favor the defendant. The comment concerning the absence of the successful
bidder as a party created implications of an indispensable party problem, but
the issue was not discussed in the opinion. The court implied that a combination of a large contract and a protest prior to the award or the beginning
of performance would support injunctive relief.
A third case from the District of Columbia, Lombard Corp. v. Resor,'"
denied the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief and granted the Government's motion for summary judgment. The contract contemplated forging
press lines to be installed in a plant owned by the Government operated on a
contract basis by Chamberlin Manufacturing Corporation. Chamberlin requested the Government to conduct a pre-award survey of Lombard to determine if it was qualified to do the work. The survey recommended that no
award be made to Lombard because it was not "responsible." Chamberlin
accordingly made the award to another bidder. Lombard protested to the
Comptroller General, and he advised that another solicitation be made including Lombard as a bidder. The Government contended that Chamberlin
was an indispensable party and that the case should, therefore, be dismissed.
The court rejected this contention, stating that the Government had "experienced no difficulty in obtaining from Chamberlin information necessary to
the defense of this suit."1 ' Although the court recognized that a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would prejudice Chamberlin, who would remain liable
on subcontracts, it found that such prejudice could be eliminated by intervention and that a judgment entered in Chamberlin's absence would be viable
since it would accord complete relief to the parties before the court. The court
therefore held that Chamberlin was a necessary rather than an indispensable
party.
155Id. at 1364.
15I0d.
'321

558

F. Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1970).
Id. at 691.
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The court also gave weight to the fact that little performance had begun,
and then issued a warning:
The Court is somewhat concerned, however, that Chamberlin may have endeavored to spend money on this project as fast as possible in order to preclude court action .... While it is obvious that an agency or contractor cannot
afford to stop all action every time a disappointed bidder files for relief, it
should be noted that in a case where the court felt there was arbitrary action
in the award of a contract, we would not hesitate to enjoin further payment
by the government, letting the chips fall where they may.'59
Finally, in National Cash Register Co. v. Richardson'0 the district court for
the District of Columbia denied a preliminary injunction, pending actions by
the GAO on a bid protest, requested by a defeated bidder on a negotiated
contract with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The court
found that "[the practices of HEW in awarding the contract were sloppy if
not irregular."'' However, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to show
the flagrant disregard for the contracting procedures and "other factors bear1
ing on the public interest""
' which would justify an injunction. Pointing out
that the successful bidder had already incurred expenses in contemplation of
performing the contract, that the contract was to commence soon, and that the
effect of an injunction would be to interfere with the procurement process,
the court denied the preliminary injunction on the grounds that it would
change, not preserve, the status quo.
The circuit court in A. G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor0 3 reversed the district
court's grant of injunctive relief. The suit was a challenge to a Department
of Defense procurement of generator sets. Technical proposals were solicited
and received, following which invitations to bid were issued to three qualified
firms, including A. G. Schoonmaker Co. Schoonmaker was the apparent low
responsible bidder. One of the two defeated bidders protested to the Comptroller General on the ground that the Schoonmaker bid was not responsive,
and the Comptroller ordered all bids to be rejected and new bids solicited
from the three qualified bidders because the IFB was ambiguous. That decision
was based on the fact that the IFB did not clearly specify whether preproduction and production models were to be assigned the same price, as was
done by one bidder, or whether they might be assigned different prices, as was
done by another bidder. Schoonmaker, claiming to be entitled to the contract
award, then sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the federal district
court. The district court judgment in effect required that Schoonmaker be
awarded the contract. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Comptroller General, in finding the bid invitation ambiguous and ordering new
invitations for bids, was not acting in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The
requested relief was denied because the court found the challenged action to
be legal. Similarly, the circuit court of appeals in Steinthal had held that the
challenged action was legal because it was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
1'9 Id.

at 693.

160324 F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1971).
01

' 1d. at 921.
162 !d.

103445 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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(However, the significance of that case goes far beyond its narrow holding,
and it will be discussed later.)
To date, not a single mandatory injunction directing the award of a contract
has stood upon appeal, with the exception of the pre-Scanwell case of Superior
Oil Co. v. Udall.1" That case involved the award of long-term government
oil leases rather than procurement. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ordered that the leases be issued to Superior Oil, the second
highest bidder, since the highest bidder had failed to sign his bid as required
by the notice and regulations. The highest bidder had requested that the
Government reject all bids and start over again. The rationale for the decision
was that "[ilt would be plainly inequitable to Superior [the second highest
bidder] and damaging to the long range public interest in the integrity of the
bidding process to allow Union [the highest bidder], whose error has caused
this problem, to have a second opportunity to bid against Superior and all
other bidders.""1 ' Superior Oil received little attention prior to Scanwell, but
it is now cited for the proposition that the federal courts have the power to
direct the award of government contracts to specific bidders."' The case is,
however, generally distinguished on its facts, as in Simpson Electric Co. v.
Seamans: "The situation presented in Superior Oil Co., where the contract
involved millions of dollars, called for a long-term performance, and had not
yet been awarded, is wholly different from a more routine, short-term procurement where performance has already begun, such as the Court is considering here."1 '
That the trend of the post-Scanwell cases is to deny equitable relief is clear.
Cases granting equitable relief such as Northeast Construction.' and National
Helium"' are definitely in the minority; not a single post-Scanwell case
granting injunctive relief to defeated bidders has stood up on appeal. A
number of cases since Scanwell have made it clear that the federal courts
1"409 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Id.at 1122.
10See,
e.g., Keco Indus., Inc. v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1970).
107317

F. Supp. 684, 688 (D.D.C. 1970).

"'In Northeast Constr. Co. v. Romney, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,459 (D.D.C.
June 21, 1971), the GAO had held the plaintiff's bid non-responsive because it left blank
the part of an appendix where it was to have specified the percentage of minority workers
to be employed. The court granted a preliminary injunction holding that the failure to comply with the requirement of copying these figures in the blanks was at most a minor irregu.
larity covered by regulations which allow for correction. The court found that the plaintiff's
bid was non-responsive in form only and that the plaintiff gained no competitive edge by
being allowed to cure the defect. Since the Government gave no reason for its failure to
follow the regulations allowing correction of minor derails and since the plaintiff was the
low bidder, the failure to award the contract to the plaintiff was arbitrary and capricious.
The court, in granting the injunction, found that there was irreparable injury to the plaintiff, an inadequate remedy at law, a public interest in seeing the bidding statutes and regulations enforced, and a high probability of success on the merits. The court also rejected
the Government's contention that the second low bidder was an indispensable party.
"'In National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan. 1971), the Kansas
federal district court granted a preliminary injunction pending a hearing on the merits.
The plaintiffs sued to enjoin the cancellation of a contract for the sale of helium to the
Government. The court found that the plaintiffs showed a reasonable probability of success
on the merits because of violations of the Helium Act and the National Environmental
Protection Act. Irreparable harm was shown because relevant inquiry and consideration was
not given to the effect of the decision to cancel the contracts in light of the National Environmental Protection Act. Although the plaintiff did secure injunctive relief, it should
be noted that this suit was on a contract cancellation rather than a bid protest.
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have reserved the power to grant mandatory injunctions and thus direct the
Government to award a contract to an aggrieved bidder.1 " In so doing, they
have held either implicitly or explicitly, as in Scanwell, that the particular
procurement agency action being challenged is not a subject "committed to
agency discretion" within the meaning of section 10 of the APA."' The
Steinthal and Wheelabrator cases, however, have found that certain areas of
government contracting are committed to agency discretion and are, therefore,
not subject to judicial review. The obvious effect is to preclude mandatory
injunctions in such cases. Even before Wheelabrator and Steinthal, the chances
for equitable relief on government contracts were small. After Steinthal and
Wheelabrator the chances seem even smaller.
B. The Availability of Damages as Relief
The prospects for obtaining damages appear slightly better. The two leading cases at present come from the Court of Claims. In Keco Industries, Inc.
v. United States"" the court considered an unsuccessful bidder's action for
damages against the United States. The bidder sought to recover both its cost
of bid preparation and its loss of anticipated profits, alleging that the Government in awarding the contract to the plaintiff's competitor knew that the
technical proposal of the plaintiff's competitor, the awardee, could not be
accomplished within the price specified in the bid. Therefore, the plaintiff contended that the Government's award of the contract amounted to a breach of
its implied contract to consider fairly and honestly the plaintiff's bid. The
court relied on Heyer Products Co. v. United States.' The court held that
Heyer was not limited to situations involving bad faith and intentional fraud,
favoritism, or discrimination on the part of the Government: "Instead, we
find that Heyer stated a broad general rule which is that every bidder has the
right to have his bid honestly considered by the Government, and if this
obligation is breached, then the injured party has the right to come into court
to try and prove his cause of action. Thus, even without Scanwell, we feel
that plaintiff should be allowed to maintain this action based on the decision
in Heyer."'
The court therefore viewed Heyer as an alternative to Scanwell for standing
purposes, but stated that Scanwell appeared to conclusively settle the standing
question. The more important aspect of the court's reading of Heyer, however,
was that it allowed the plaintiff to recover damages, but only to a limited
extent. The court allowed damages for bid preparation costs, but not for the
loss of anticipated profits. The rationale was based on Heyer-it would be
improper to award the plaintiff lost profits since the contract from which it
would have made such profits never came into existence. The court bolstered
this reasoning by stating that even if the successful awardee's bid had been
rejected, there is no certainty that the award would have been made to the
"70See, e.g., Keco Indus., Inc. v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1970); Simpson
Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970).
...
Address by William Munves, supra note 66.
r428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
" 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956). See notes 26-32 supra, and accompanying text.
11428 F.2d at 1237.
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plaintiff. Consequently, the plaintiff should be allowed to recover only those
costs incurred in preparing its technical proposals and bid.
The Court of Claims also considered the question of damages for disappointed bidders on government contracts in Continental Business Enterprises, Inc. v. United States." The plaintiff was seeking to recover damages
for the amount expended in preparing a procurement proposal which it contended was not fairly and honestly considered. The court stated the Heyer rule
"that it is an implied condition of every request for offers that each of them
will be fairly and honestly considered,"'' and held that Keco extended the
Heyer rule "to all procurement situations, and that an aggrieved bidder who
makes out a prima facie case of arbitrary and capricious action by the Government is entitled at trial to prove the merits of his claim."" The court, relying
on Steinthal, emphasized the high standard of proof required of a plaintiff to
show arbitrary and capricious action, and held that the plaintiff must show
that there was no reasonable basis for the challenged agency action. The court
recognized that the remedy of damages, under the Keco and Heyer rationale,
is an alternative to the equitable remedies available under Scanwell. The
court emphasized that the remedy of damages can protect the public interest
in preventing arbitrary and capricious action without disrupting the procurement process as an injunction does. The court concluded that "[tihe Heyer
rule was extended in Keco to give aggrieved bidders a damages remedy in lieu
of the equitable remedies available . . . after Scanwell .

. .

. Apparently the

necessity for such an alternative remedy is even greater than it was when we
decided Keco because of the difficulties experienced by the courts in handling
Scanwell-type cases."""6

The Continental Business and Keco cases indicate a willingness of the
Court of Claims to allow damages, but only to the extent of bid preparation
costs and in lieu of injunctive relief. These cases, in conjunction with those
denying equitable relief, may forecast the end of the availability of equitable
relief and the establishment of damages, limited to bid preparation costs, as
the only acceptable form of relief. Certainly from the standpoint of the
contractors, this solution would not always be adequate. Damages in Scanwelltype cases, however measured, may be viewed by contractors as never being
an adequate remedy at law. The primary concern of the contractors is often
that they keep their plants and personnel in continuous operation, thereby
serving their long-range interests better than any single award of damages in
a particular case."'
The courts have not reached a consensus on the question of whether damages, as defined in Keco to include only bid preparation costs, are an adequate
remedy at law justifying a refusal to grant equitable relief. Perhaps the most
important statement of the issue was made in Steinthal: "The availability of a
damages remedy in the Court of Claims, which in many cases will compensate the frustrated bidder's realized financial costs (i.e., the bid preparation
171452 F.2d 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
"'Id. at 1019.
177 Id.
171

Id. at 1022.

"" Address by William Munves, supra note 66.
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costs) resulting from the illegal agency action, provides a sound equitable
basis for the exercise of ... discretion in considering whether to entertain a
suit for injunctive relief." 8 '
At present, the question of the adequacy of the remedy at law remains
unanswered. Of course, the question of adequacy of the remedy at law may
not be determinative on the issue of injunctive relief. As indicated earlier, " '
the most important consideration in the grant or denial of injunctive relief
will probably be the undue interference with the smooth functioning of the
procurement process which injunctive relief may cause. In addition to the
delay, expense, and inconvenience to the Government that may be caused by
such interference, there are adverse effects upon the successful bidder. If the
procurement is enjoined, he must await the outcome of the litigation, and he
cannot take on other business which would hamper his capability to perform
the contract while the litigation is pending. If the court orders the award of
the contract to another bidder, of course, he loses the contract. Even assuming
that the court upholds the original award, the successful bidder's costs may be
increased due to the delay.
In any event, most cases since Scanwell have not allowed injunctive relief,
and the trend may be developing to allow damages for bid preparation costs
as the only relief to the aggrieved bidder. The basis for allowing damages will
probably be that damages do not unduly interfere with the procurement
process while an injunction often does. The courts have undertaken extensive
efforts to remedy the problems of judicial intervention created by Scanwell. It
is interesting to note that one major factor has seemed to permeate the consideration of standing, reviewability, and relief on the merits. That factor is
the unacceptable extent to which judicial relief, particularly injunctive relief,
may interfere with the expeditious functioning of the government procurement programs. This was a major consideration in Perkins, in which prospective bidders were denied standing. It was a major consideration in Wheelabrator, in which certain procurement decisions were held nonreviewable
because "committed to agency discretion." It was also a major consideration
in Keco, National Cash Register, and Simpson Electric which denied equitable
relief on the merits. The courts in recent cases have also attempted to limit
judicial intervention by deferring to the expertise of the GAO, the traditional
forum for bid protests prior to Scanwell.
IV.

THE ROLE OF THE

GAO

Prior to Scanwell, disappointed bidders were left to whatever relief they
could obtain from the GAO. The Comptroller General moved into the gap
left by the courts, which, under the Perkins rationale, refused to hear bidders'
18816 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,781, at 85,813 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 1971). See also
Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970). But cf. Gould, Inc. v.
Chafee, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,449, at 85,599 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1971): "The Government's argument for dismissal [of the complaint for injunctive relief] rested in substantial measure on the assertion that [petitioners] have an adequate remedy at law. But
it is questionable whether [petitioner's] legal remedies as aggrieved bidders . . . are adequate enough to justify dismissal of their suit for want of equity."
181See text following note 133 sup-ra.
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protests of government contract awards. The Comptroller General, as head of
the GAO,"' consistently asserted the right to review the actions of contracting
officers in the competitive bidding area to assure compliance with the applicable statutes and regulations.' 3 The relief which an aggrieved bidder can
obtain from the GAO, however, is limited since the Comptroller will generally
not direct the award of a contract to a particular contractor." 4 The GAO has
no express statutory authority to cancel or prevent awards, and, as a practical
matter, its only power to do so rests on the fact that if the agency disregards
the GAO's decision, the GAO may later disallow payment on the contract, or
the accountable GAO officers may refuse to make or certify payment for fear
of personal liability."' A major complaint of contractors is that if the protest
is not received until after the award of the contract, the Comptroller will
generally allow the contract to stand even though he believes the award was
improperly made."' Additionally, in the case of protests after award, the GAO
does not stay performance of the contract pending consideration of the protest. This fact has led to the "Pyrrhic victory,"-GAO determinations of irregularities in contracts that have no practical impact, since the contract is
already substantially or fully performed by the time the GAO renders its
decision." ' The GAO has recently adopted changes in its procedures in hopes
of correcting some of these problems,"' but the changes do not remedy what
contractors see as the key defect-the inability to enjoin the Government and
halt the procurement process.
Considerations such as those apparently led the courts to conclude that a
bid protest to the GAO was not a prerequisite to judicial review."' Coupled
with the corollary principle that a GAO opinion is not binding on the federal
courts,'" the GAO's role as final arbiter of bid protests has been effectively
destroyed."' Although there were a few early post-Scanwell cases in which the
courts enjoined contract award or performance pending GAO review,"' the
federal courts largely ignored the GAO in the cases decided immediately
after Scanwell.
This attitude soon changed, however, as the Court of Appeals for the
"531 U.S.C. § 41 (1971).
"'.See, e.g., 17 CoMP. GEN. 554 (1938).
"'4See NASH & CIBINIC 963 n.3. 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1971) requires claims for payment
on government contracts to be processed through the GAO. As a practical matter, this practice became too unwieldy and the present practice is one of post-transactional audit. NASH
& CIBINIc 68 n.7.
1"Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 35, at 375.
"6 NASH & CIBrNIC 964 n.4. See, e.g., 44 CoMP. GEN. 761 (1965).
5,7 "In many . . . cases award is made on the basis of a finding of urgency, sometimes
warranted and sometimes not, pending the disposition of a bid pxotest [by the GAOl.
Even in such cases it is rare for the GAO to direct cancellation. Thus, the 'relief' gained
by a bid protestor most often turns out to be a pyrrhic victory." Cibinic & Lasken, supra
note 35, at 395.
18See 13 Gov'T CONT. REP. 5 23,810 (Feb. 12, 1972).
"' See, e.g., Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Keco
Indus., Inc. v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1970); Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans,
317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970).
"See, e.g., A.G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 319 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd
on other grounds, 445 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"' Address by William Munves, supra note 66.
"'See, e.g., Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor (D.D.C. 1970) (unreported;
see 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,313); Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Thiokol Chem. Corp. (N.D.
Cal. 1970) (unreported; voluntarily dismissed; see 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 83,786).
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District of Columbia Circuit in three cases instituted an attitude of judicial
deference to the expertise of the GAO. The first of these cases was A. G.
Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor.' 3 In Schoonmaker, an unsuccessful bidder initiated
a bid protest with the GAO, and the GAO decided in his favor. The Army,
which was conducting the disputed procurement, decided to rely on the GAO
opinion which advised cancellation and readvertisement of the contract. The
district court held that the GAO opinion was not a lawful basis for the Army's
action and ordered the contract awarded to Schoonmaker. The court of appeals
reversed, stating that, if the GAO's opinion was reasonable, the court would
not conclude that the Army's reliance on the GAO was arbitrary or capricious.
In Steinthal the court recognized that a GAO opinion is not necessarily dispositive, but stressed that "[a] court's reluctance to interfere with the executive
procurement process should be particularly strong where, as here, the General
Accounting Office has
made a determination upholding the procurement of' 1'
ficers on the merits. 9
In Wheelabrator the court further emphasized the importance of the GAO.
The court stated that district courts may apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to the GAO."' This doctrine of primary jurisdiction determines whether
the court or an agency should make the initial determination on a given issue.
Although the doctrine may allow an agency to make the initial decision, the
court is not prevented from postponing its decision until after the agency
decision, and then deciding to set aside or modify the agency decision if necessary. The idea of administrative expertise contributes somewhat to the doctrine but this idea does not require a transfer of power from courts to agencies.
The principal reason behind the doctrine is a coordination of work between
the courts and administrative agencies, with the courts deferring to the agencies
on matters peculiarly within the agencies' specialized field, particularly where
to do otherwise would subject those parties who are under the continuous
regulation of an agency to conflicting requirements. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction has been developed in such areas as rate regulation in the transportation and communication industries.'" The court's use of that doctrine
with regard to the GAO suggests a position of substantial importance for the
GAO. Although the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine to the
GAO may be somewhat dubious as a matter of law, its use by the court is an
indication of the deference which the court accords the GAO.
Wheelabrator emphasized the expertise of the GAO, and pointed out the
volume of bid protests which it processes. The court stated that the importance
of the GAO had not been undercut by Scanwell, and that there has been increasing resort by aggrieved bidders to the GAO, even though Scanwell held
that exhaustion of the GAO remedy was not necessary when it would be
futile. In the court's own language, the use of a preliminary injunction "pending GAO determinations may provide a felicitous blending of remedies and
mutual reinforcement of forums .... "191
...
319 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1970).
16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,781, at 85,815.
19516 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,780, at 85,803.
"'See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 373-81 (1972).
".. 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 5 80,780, at 85,803.
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The Steinthal and Wheelabrator decisions, although they have not restored
the GAO to its position as final arbiter, have given recognition to its expertise
and importance. It is likely that the GAO, in response to these cases, will reverse its position taken in recent opinions that it will not consider the merits
of protests which are before the courts.'9 ' The result will probably be to add
impetus to the withdrawal of judicial intervention in the area of bidders'
suits on government contracts.
V.

CONCLUSION

Aggrieved bidders on federal government contracts now have standing to
sue, but this has not meant that they have been successful in obtaining
judicial review or judicial relief. The federal courts seem to be returning to a
renewed emphasis on consideration of the impact of judicial interference with
the federal procurement process, a consideration which was basic to the
Perkins decision. The federal courts have begun to realize that while they may
permit aggrieved bidders to bring suit on government contract awards, they
must at the same time create stringent requirements for the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief or success on the merits if the public interest in
efficient federal procurement is to be maintained. The courts have attempted
to accomplish this purpose partly by creating, under the APA, a doctrine of
nonreviewability which precludes judicial review of procurement decisions
which are "committed to agency discretion." The primary factors on which
the courts base a determination that agency action is "committed to agency
discretion" are broad agency discretion granted by law, expertise of the agency
in complex technical or quasi-technical matters within their specialty, and the
unacceptable extent to which judicial review and preliminary or other injunctive relief will interfere with the expeditious functioning of the procurement process.
The District of Columbia Circuit has stated the scope of review in bid
protest cases to be that the court will not interfere with the procurement
process unless the challenged agency actions are without any rational basis. It
has also recognized a sound discretion to deny, for public policy reasons such
as the public interest in the smooth functioning of the federal procurement,
declaratory or injunctive relief in procurement actions. A judicial trend may
be developing to view damages, confined to recovery of bid preparation costs,
as the only acceptable form of relief for disappointed bidders since an award
of damages, unlike injunctive relief, does not delay or interfere with the
award or performance of contracts.
The few reported cases since Wheelabrator and Steinthal indicate that these
two cases will be read rather literally by the lower courts, thereby destroying
most disappointed bidder lawsuits. Although other circuits across the country
have not yet voiced an opinion on these two cases, it seems that the impact
of these cases will be extensive.'9 In addition, the District of Columbia circuit
1"8See, e.g., COMp. GEN. DEc. No. B-17182 (July 19, 1971).
1"'The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia is the seminal circuit in government
contract law, for reasons of both history and geography. Address by William Munves,
supra note 66.
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court has re-emphasized the importance and the expertise of the GAO, indicating a new judicial deference to the GAO in bid protest cases and signalling
a further judicial retreat from review of disappointed bidders' suits. Unfortunately, the GAO has not proven to be an effective forum for aggrieved
bidders.
If the pendulum swings back to the point of judicial non-interference found
in Perkins, the public as well as the contractors stand to lose. There are
competing factors which must be considered in granting or denying judicial
review or relief for aggrieved bidders on government contracts. On the one
hand, there is the need for speedy and efficient enforcement of government
procurement programs. On the other hand, there are both the individual's
interest, as a "person aggrieved" by agency action, in having a claim adjudicated, and the public's interest in seeing that government agencies follow
the procurement procedures established by law. It would seem that many
government procurements are not so vital to the public interest that any interference with them would be unacceptable. Further, it would seem that the
public interest in seeing that procurements are conducted according to law
could often outweigh any detrimental effects caused by judicial review, particularly in a routine procurement not vital to the defense, safety, or health of
the public. After Wheelabrator and Steinthal, such instances may rarely be
recognized, if at all, by the courts. Wheelabrator and Steinthal do not overrule the standing holding in Scanwell, but the gap between standing and
success on the merits has now become so great that the achievement of the
right to sue may have proven to be a hollow victory.

